of these qualities could be forgiven if a candidate has a good cook and good wines. Article 4 instructed members to leave all their ranks and titles at the door in favor of the titles bestowed upon them by the order itself, so as to create an atmosphere of informality and social equality, while article 7 mandated that all the speeches by members were to last no longer that two minutes so as to avoid the "dread" of "yawning" and the "unpardonable crime" of boredom. Insofar as "profusion is the enemy irreconcilable of delicacy," no more than three dishes were to be put on the table during the meals (article 5), and nobody was to force members to eat and drink beyond the dictates of their own appetite (article 6). Naturally, the members were to observe secrecy, while there would be also special signs and rituals allowing a member to recognize his fellows wherever they met (presumably, as the order would grow, there would also be members who have never meet each other personally).
Most notably, the preamble and article 2 banned any and all women from entering the order: indeed, the preamble cited the "multiplicité de passions" caused by women (with an appropriate reference to Adam's fall) as the reason for creating the order, to begin with. By excluding women and generally by "tempering the ardor of certain desires," the charter would contribute to "sweet harmony" and "happiness," for which the prospective members apparently aspired. The charter also explicitly mandated the brothers to maintain "liaison sincere, close and cordial" and "friendship devoid of all prejudices" that are caused by "difference of Religions or Nations" (article 11). To this end, the charter even banned all "ceremonial" toasts honoring "Emperors, Kings, Potentates, or others" (article 14). Finally, the charter sought to link the order to Russian realities by referencing caviar alongside "Champagne, Bourgogne," and other Western European wines (article 15), or including a triple "Poklanitzes" (apparently, from poklonitsia, v., "to bow") in the order's rituals (article 16).
While the charter is not signed, the order's Grand Master and "Protector" named in the title are easily recognizable. "Jaques Stuart" is clearly James Francis (Diego Francisco) FitzJames Stuart (1696-1738), 2 nd Duke of Berwick and 2 nd Duke of Liria and Xerica, Grandee of Spain 1 st class. His father, an illegitimate son of James II by Arabella Churchill, the sister of future Duke of Marlborough, left England after the Glorious Revolution and made a very successful military career in the service of France and Spain. James Francis Fitz-James Stuart, usually referred to in the literature as the Duke of Liria, is most notable for his embassy to Russia, where he stayed in 1727-1730. The "Protector" is Baron Gustav von Mardefeld (1664-1729), Prussian envoy extraordinary at the the Russian court from 1718-1728. 7 Both diplomats produced extensive dispatches (and de Liria also a "dairy") that have been for over a century mined for information by historians. 8 Neither of them, however, mentioned this episode in their published papers. II. Russia, of course, had by 1728 her own tradition of fraternal societies and orders. Most notable is that regard were the Order of St. Andrew and the mock fraternity that existed in the 7 On him see Josef Krusche, "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der ständigen diplomatischen Vertretung Brandenburg-Preussens am Carenhofe bis zum Eintritt Russlands in die Reihe der europäischen Grossmächte", Jahrbücher für Kultur context of the All-Drunken Assembly, both created by Peter I. Both of these outfits also played important political roles: while the Order of St. Andrew, among other things, served as a conduit for relationships of reciprocity and mutual recognition between Peter and some of the European princes and aristocrats, the All-Drunken Assembly allowed the monarch to (re)structure the loyalties and legitimacies within the Russian elite. A similar role was probably played by the socalled Bengo-Collegium, or the "famous Great-British monastery" that existed between 1708-1720 (and possibly longer) and included some of the most prominent members of the British colony in Russia. In its mocking and obscene tone and content the charter of this fraternity appears to follow the model of the the All-Drunken Assembly. Even though we know nothing about its activities, or whether indeed it had conducted any activities at all, S. F. Platonov, who discovered the document almost a century ago, hypothesized that this fraternity could have helped to integrate the British expatriates into the world of Petrine amusements and socializing, serving as something like the "British chapter" of the All-Drunken Assembly. 9 Certainly, these Petrine practices were not unique to Russia: in many respects, they were echoes of Western European fashion for forming fraternal societies, including the masonic lodges, that was gaining prominence exactly at that time. Highly relevant for the Northern Europe was also the example of "Tabakskollegium" that existed at the court of Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia as a forum for informal fraternizing between the king and a narrow circle of confidants.
Besides Petrine orders and assemblies, one could get insights into the internal workings of confraternal societies of that era from the dairy of Friedrich Wilhelm von Berhgolz (1699-1765), a gentleman of the bedchamber to Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp (1700-1739), who stayed in Russia throughout the early 1720s, as he sought the hand of one of Peter I's daughters in marriage. The diary presents setting up mock orders as a common, even conventional practice in the context of small Northern European courts; such initiatives apparently easily came to life, and could as easily be abandoned. Thus, already on the way to St. Petersburg, during a stopover in Revel on June 5, 1721, the duke and his companions organized a "toast-collegium" -an echo of "Tabakskollegium," perhaps? According to Bergholz, the members of the tiny Holstein travelling court came together at the quarters of Privy Councilor von Bassewitz to listen to and to vote for acceptance of the statute of the "collegium," that has been previously composed by one of the courtiers and approved by the duke. The gatherings of the new collegium were to begin at 5pm, and to last till 11pm, with dinner served at 9pm. Between 5pm and 9pm the members were free to entertain themselves by smoking, playing cards, or walking around; the dinner was to always include an identical set of dishes. Bergholz stresses that the attendees were not to be forced to drink in excess of what they themselves desired, a provision that was echoed in the statute of the "illustrious and incomparable order" (article 6) and that is especially notable in light of the practices of the Petrine court, of which many a member of this collegium would later become victims during their stay in Russia. Besides the serenissimus dominus praeses (the duke himself), the society included "ordinary" and "extraordinary" members, who were to host gatherings in turns at their quarters. There were also special procedures for admitting new members, accompanied by singing a Latin verse ("Dignus est entrare in nostrum societatem"), ceremonial signing of the charter, etc. 10 The diary bears witness to at least few meetings of the society for the purpose of drinking and merrymaking. He also demonstrates how the members used the provisions of the charter structure the gatherings to their advantage. For example, did one of the hosts by giving a signal for guests to end the party at 11pm: according to Bergholz, even though the duke would have preferred continue partying, he felt obliged to comply with the rules.
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In addition to the "toast-collegium," however, Bergholz also mentions a "noble vorschneider-collegium," started by the duke and some of the courtiers in April 1722, already in Russia. Apparently, "His Highness had been harboring an intention for quite a while to devise some sort of evening entertainment for himself, and finally came upon the idea of composing a society of four or five individuals, with whom he could, whenever convenient, dine, spend evenings, and practice the skills of "food-cutting" (vorschneiden)." The society likewise had a charter, its provisions apparently being mostly about serving drinks and dinners, and regulating the conduct at the table. There were only five "ordinary" members who were all to be "equal to each other, and none of them subordinated to another," and who were to perform in turns the roles of the marshal and the vorschneider at the society's meeting. The rule of five seems to have been an important organizing principle: besides five members, there were to be no more and no fewer than five dishes and five toasts at each dinner.
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Further, already on May 3, 1722, on the occasion of his name day, the duke founded, "the order of the wine grape" (ordre de la grappe). 13 The name of this outfit sounds exactly like that of a much older association founded in 1693 in Arles in France: it focused on various forms of socializing related to drinking, obviously, and gained considerable popularity -there were chapters in a number of French cities, but also in Cologne, Berne, Milan, Rome, Cadiz and even Constantinople. It appears to have been a relatively well-known society as this order put out a variety of publications related to its activities, so the duke could have learned about it from them -unless, of course, he was an actual member of the order and sought to formally create its chapter in Russia. 14 Notably, this particular order was created during the duke's visit to Baron
Mardefeld's dacha, in the presesence of other foreign diplomats. Just two weeks later, however, the duke founds still other order, the Ordre de la Tulipe ou de pucellage (i.e. virginity). This society was established after having dined with a group of Swedish officers -prisoners of war: it might seem that it was meant to express his bond with the Swedes, as he was a claimant to the Swedish throne. Yet, while the duke made himself the order's Commander, whilst Bergholz became the senior knight, nobody else was elevated to the order on that day. The members were supposed to wear a sign made of a tulip and a narcissus in their buttonholes. Creation of these new formats did not necessarily mean that the older ones were abandoned: in this case, on the very next day the duke held a meeting of the "vorschneidercollegium." 15 Finally, a month later, on June 22, 1722, Bergholz mentions still other (or perhaps, the same?) order that "His Highness intends to institute this summer," with himself as a Grand Master: of this order we only know that it involved special uniforms ("very handsome") for its 11 Berkhgolz, "Dnevnik kamer-iunkera," in Neistovyi reformator, 163. 12 Berkhgolz, "Dnevnik kamer-iunkera," in Neistovyi reformator, 393-95. 13 Berkhgolz, "Dnevnik kamer-iunkera," in Neistovyi reformator, 412. members, who were all to be bachelors. 16 Although Bergholz's diary does not reflect any regular meetings of these societies, he does mention that on September 1, 1723 all the members of one of these order were instructed to make for themselves new, handsome uniforms, and the duke offered financial help to those who had difficulty affording it. On September 29 of the same year, members of the duke's court had to sign some sort of a document related to their "secret society" that was, moreover, different from the version they've seen three days earlier. There was also a formal meeting, "where the documents were properly introduced, and His Highness gave a speech."
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These societies were clearly intended as an amusement for the young -barely twenty years old -and somewhat restless Duke of Holstein-Gottorp as he was travelling to a strange and alien land accompanied by a small clique of male courtiers. This was explicitly an amusement, and Bergholz descriptions reveal how such games were devised, and how the courtiers earnestly joined in: the serial nature of the duke's initiatives, as well as his retinue's reaction to them indicates, perhaps, the game's routinized, habitual character. There were other games as well: the very same Bergholz describes how in the summer time, when his court retreated to a suburban estate, the duke divided his retinue into two companies of a handful of "soldiers" (i.e. grooms, lackeys, etc.) each, to be drilled by their appointed commanders. Again, the courtiers (who were, by the way, mostly professional military men) earnestly joined in, for days after days drilling the hapless servants in the heat of the Russian summer.
18
One finds in Bergholz's descriptions certain elements that are parallel to our order -and perhaps, to such societies in general. One is the presence of certain numbers that likely had certain symbolism in them: five in the case of vorschneider-collegium, three in the case of the anti-sobriety order. Another is the presumption of informality and social equality, as well as their exclusively male character. There are also differences, however: most notably, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's orders and collegiums, similarly to Peter I's All-Drunken Assembly and other confraternities, and similarly to such Western European societies as the Prussian Tabakskollegium, were ultimately about regulating access to a prince, about defining a circle of insiders with whom he deigned to socialize informally. These orders, thus, entered into a complex dialogue with the official social and service hierarchies, partially undermining and negating, and partially reasserting them. They also reflected broader political concerns of their sovereign founders: thus, at the meetings of vorschneider-collegium the members were to toast: "Pray the Lord soon, and very soon, helps our wishes come true," a reference to the hoped-for betrothal of the duke to one of Peter's daughters.
19
The anti-sobriety order, however, was not build around a prince. Indeed, Bergholz's diary also contains a references to another venue of associational life in post-Petrine Russia that, just like the anti-sobriety order, was not linked to the personality of any particular monarch. And while the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's confraternities were limited to the members of his court, this format apparently had an international audience -in fact, it provided a forum for socializing for members of the diplomatic corps posted in Russia. Bergholz reports that on October 29, 1722, there began regular meetings of foreign diplomats: ten of them agreed to host such meetings in turn, three times a week. While there is no evidence that this association had a name or a charter, it did have certain rules which Bergholz describes. The meetings were to begin at 4pm, with dinner of no more than seven courses to be served at 8pm. Among its founding members were, inter alia, Baron Mardefeld (most likely, the very same Gustave Mardefeld, the would-be Protecteur of the Ordre des Antisobres), and Jacques de Campredon, the French envoy (as we remember, it is in the French diplomatic archive that the charter of the Ordre des Antisobres was found). Notably, unlike the anti-sobriety order, these meetings were not off limits for the ladies: Bergholz reports that the Swedish envoy wanted to bring his countess along, and so Privy Councilor Bassewitz lent him his carriage. Two additional details appear to be significant. First, while Bergholz describes these meetings in the fall of 1722 as a new initiative, he also mentions in passing the meetings of the "society of the past winter": apparently, such gathering of diplomats took place in the previous year as well. Second, among the society's members he also mentions Ostermann: it is reasonable to suggest that he must have used this diplomatic club to conduct informal negotiations on behalf of his sovereign master. 20 These associational formats certainly provide important background for the Ordre des Antisobres proposed in January 1728: in particular, they indicate that the very idea of a formally established confraternity focused on drinking would appear very familiar for Russian courtiers and especially for foreign courtiers residing on the banks of the Neva.
III.
What purposes the order might have served and how it might have functioned we might deduce, perhaps, from the story of another drinking association, with a nearly identical name, the "Société des antisobres," founded at exactly the same time, i.e. early in 1728, by kings Augustus II of Saxony and Poland and Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia. 21 In the preceding years the SaxonPrussian relations were characterized by tensions and rivalry, so much so that when a random incident in 1727 provoked Friedrich Wilhelm I to threaten the Saxon-Polish ambassador in Berlin with reprisals, the diplomat deemed it prudent to flee the country. In this context, some of the leading courtiers on both sides -most notably, Field Marshal Jacob Heinrich von Flemming on the Saxon-Polish side and Friedrich von Seckendorf on the Prussian -sought to restore rapport and, perhaps, even to bring about an alliance. By January 7, 1728, the two sides prepared their respective versions of a treaty between two countries geared towards neighborly friendship, amicable settlement of differences, and even mutual support in the event of an attack by the third parties. As this treaty was a true diplomatic revolution in the region, it was to be kept secret from the neighboring powers, most notably, the Imperials and the Russians, who, however, already by February were getting a vague sense that something was amiss. Indeed, it was decided to hold a visit by Frederick William I to Dresden to celebrate the agreement -a visit that turned into four weeks (January 13 to February 12) of partying, dancing, hunting, and, of course, drinking. As Anne-Simone Rous points out in her recent study of this episode, half of the Prussian Tabakskollegium accompanied their king on this trip, so it was natural, perhaps, that conversation turned towards setting up a society devoted to wine-drinking, a great passion of both rulers. According to her, "Société des antisobres" must have been organized no later than 20 Berkhgolz, "Dnevnik kamer-iunkera," January 21, or perhaps already on January 16, as the monarchs are described as feasting "a la table de confidence." The society, alternatively referred to as the "Table ronde à la cour de Pologne," had its own statute of 25 articles. These stressed secrecy, of course, as well as equality, emphasized by the round shape of the table around which the members gathered and the use of aliases that either mocked their holders' personalities, or perverted their status in real life ("washerwoman" for the royal princess, etc.) Women were not excluded; the statute set the maximum number of members at twelve, with up to four among them females. The two kings were co-heads of the society. Participants of the society's gatherings were to check all their worries and business preoccupations at the door and to bring along to the table a stock of good humor, joy, and cheerful mood; any serious discussions about affairs of the state were prohibited. Instead, speeches were to be short and entertaining, and members had to endure being ridiculed without getting angry. The society had a seal of its own and gathered in a specially furnished wine cellar around a specially designed inlaid table.
Unlike the case with the Russian order, we can be certain that the meetings of the society did take place, and extensive amounts of wine were indeed consumed. Records refer to "worship of Bacchus" and hours-long "battles" which left the members dead drunk. Importantly for our purposes, the society did function for few years as a platform for Saxon-Prussian rapprochement: it served as a channel for amicable and informal contacts between the two monarch and their advisors, as well as for settling disputes. Fundamentally, though, it seems to have been animated by the efforts of such courtiers as Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel, the Cabinet Minister in Saxony, Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow in Prussia (known to his friends as "Biberius" for his heavy drinking habits), or Count Friedrich Heinrich von Seckendorff, the influential Habsburg envoy in Berlin: it was a natural vehicle for attempts to reorient Prussian foreign policy and, perhaps, even to engineer a defense treaty between Prussia, the Habsburgs, and Poland-Saxony. In that sense, the fate of the society followed the fate of the Saxon-Prussian relations and of those officials who advocated this foreign policy. The fall of von Manteuffel and the rise of the pro-French party of Count Karl Heinrich von Hoym in Dresden seems to have been particularly decisive in that regard. August II himself died in 1733, and the next year von Seckendorff left Berlin.
That this society was created exactly at the same time as our order is highly significant, of course, given the personalities of its two presumed founders. Mardefeld, the order's "Protector," was a Prussian diplomat who must have been aware of his king's new initiative. On the other hand, de Liria, the grand master, passed through both the Saxon and the Prussian capitals on his way to St. Petersburg. He arrived to Dresden on September 14, 1727, stayed there for two weeks, and from there proceeded to Berlin. 22 As the envoy of the king of Spain and a highly-ranked aristocrat of pan-European standing and connections, he was well-received by the sovereigns and their ministers in both capitals. In particular, de Liria mentions in his diary his meetings with Flemming, Manteuffel, Wackerbarth, Seckendorff, and Grumbkow -all of them intimately involved in the Saxon-Prussian negotiations that resulted in the creation of "Société des antisobres." If this society was being planned in advance, he would have been extremely likely to have learned about it during his travel.
IV.
If the Saxon-Prussian society was set up as a vehicle for a very specific diplomatic project, what could be the purpose of creating the Ordre des Antisobres? The duke moved to set up this fraternity after having stayed in Russia for merely a month: how exactly was the birth of this order linked to de Liria's arrival in St. Petersburg, and what, if anything, could be said about the project's subsequent fate? Neither de Liria, nor Mardefeld mention it in their published papers (although, it should be added, the nineteenth-century publication of Mardefeld's reports is, unfortunately, highly fragmentary). Is it possible to decipher the order's place in its founders' strategy and tactics, or should it be understood as a more general platform for sociability and fraternization, not necessarily an element of any specific intrigue?
To understand de Liria's goals and priorities properly, it is important to remember that he was, in fact, a servant to two masters -Philip V, his nominal sovereign, and his uncle James III Stuart, the "Old Pretender," with whom the duke maintained secret correspondence and to whom he professed unlimited loyalty. In fact, as Rebecca Wills demonstrates, this does not necessarily mean that the Jacobite allegiances necessarily invalidated his loyalty to the Spanish crown: when the shifting diplomatic fortunes made the Jacobite and Spanish interests incompatible, de Liria did earnestly pursued the policy mandated by Philip V. Still, insofar as it was possible, he did see himself as negotiating on behalf of both sovereigns. He actively planned for invasion of England by the pro-Stuart forces, and while in Russia openly touted his Jacobite affiliation and positioned himself as the leader of the Jacobite network that dated back to the 17 th century and by the late 1720s included also numerous Scotts in Russian service. 23 De Liria's mission to Russia, of course, took place during the period when Europe's system of alliances was especially fluid and undergoing a major realignment. The Treaty of Vienna, signed on April 30, 1725, brought together the Habsburgs and Spain; opposed to them were the signatories of the Treaty of Hannover, most notably, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, later joined by the Netherlands. In response to this, in August 1726 Russia joined the Vienna allies. In another major diplomatic coup, in the same month Prussia seceded from alliance of Hannover, thereby putting George I's possessions on the continent at considerable risk. 24 Thus, early in 1727, when de Liria was being dispatched to "Muscovy," the government of Philip V hoped, most importantly, that pursuant to this treaty, Russia would "take some action" against England. Ideally, this would include dispatching a fleet with an expeditionary force that would land in England, overthrow George I, and restore the throne to the Stuart dynasty. At the very least ("even if an attempt is made to implement this plan with a small number of soldiers") this would divert George I's attention and forces from Gibraltar, which Philip V was planning to attack. 25 This, in turn, means that at this point time de Liria's official duty as the envoy of the Spanish crown aligned especially well with his personal loyalties as an ardent Jacobite. Notably, one of the key players in St. Petersburg on whose support de Liria could count was the very same Duke of Holstein-Gottorp whom we mentioned earlier in connection with a variety of mock orders created at his court. The duke's claims both to the Holstein territory annexed by the king of Denmark and to the Swedish throne were very much central to the hostility between Russia and England: London viewed these claims as a vehicle for St. Petersburg's attempts to expand its power in the Baltics and Northern Germany at the expense of England' allies. In that sense, the interests and the efforts of the Jacobite and the Holstein cliques in Russia have been aligned for quite some time, going back to Peter I's reign. After Catherine I's accession the duke, finally, managed to marry her daughter, Tsesarevna Anna, and became a member of the Supreme Privy Council and a reasonably important political player in his own right. In terms of foreign policy, the empress, it seems, was ready to take up her son-in-law's cause in Europe, while he himself proved willing to let his support to the Habsburg-Spanish and Jacobite anti-Hannoverian initiatives insofar as it advanced his own claims. 26 In January 1727
there was even a talk in Europe about alternative plan -rather than sending an expeditionary force to land in England, the Russians allegedly considered supporting the Imperials in a land attack on Hannover. 27 So, at the outset of his mission de Liria saw winning over the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp as the central element in his diplomatic strategy. Remarkably, as he intimated to James III in March 1727, this was to be achieved by means of the "dinking diplomacy," i.e. by "… the varietys of my wines," as "… in that part of the world all affairs are concluded on a bottle." 28 This choice of diplomatic tactics might have been based on cultural stereotypes about Russia, of course, but as we have seen, it might have actually been a good fit for the task at hand, given Holstein-Gottorp own tastes and interests. -quite possibly, it reflected the intelligence that de Liria obtained through his numerous Jacobite contacts in Russia. So, de Liria was departing on his journey in high spirits, looking forward enthusiastically for an opportunity to negotiate over good wine on behalf of both of his masters, Philip V and James III. Yet, as he was making his progress across the continent, stopping on his way to reconcile James III with his wife; to confer with ministers in Vienna; and to pay court to the sovereigns in Dresden and Berlin, the diplomatic situation in Europe and the political currents in Russia were rapidly changing. In March, just as de Liria was planning his diplomatic moves, the government of George I managed, at great expense, to persuade Sweden to join the alliance of Hannover. This, in turn dealt a severest blow to Holstein-Gottorp's political influence in St. Petersburg. 29 Even worse, on June 5, while in Vienna, de Liria learned about the death of Catherine I. The Imperial ministers expressed hopes that this would not change Russia's foreign policy, but the duke was clearly apprehensive. 30 Indeed, any hope for Russia's active support for Holstein-Gottorp's cause was now gone, and soon the duke was pretty much forced by Menshikov to leave Russia. Nor did the latter's own downfall and exile in September 1727 improved the situation in de Liria's eyes. Even though Menshikov might have been earlier hostile to Holstein-Gottorp and the Vienna alliance, now his removal could lead to the rise of a mythical "old Russian" party and Russia's retreat from European politics -something that would make her irrelevant for the interests of de Liria's both sovereigns.
V. As we know from his reports back to Madrid, after travelling from Berlin via Danzig, Courland, Riga, and Narva, the duke arrived to St. Petersburg on November 23, 1727, but had to 26 See Wills, Jacobites and Russia, 97-123, for an overview. 27 
31 First the liveries for his retinue had to be made, and then, as the Russian government argued, the Neva had to freeze over so that some of the important court officials who lived on the Vasil'evskii Island, could cross over to the palace. Still later there was the celebration of Tsesarevna Elizabeth's birthday, an event to which de Liria could not be admitted because he hasn't been formally introduced at the court yet; according to his version of the events, other foreign diplomates were also excluded from it so as not to slight de Liria. 32 To what extent could these explanations be taken at their face value, is not clear: there might have been, of course, political reason for this delay. Finally, on December 19/30, 1727 de Liria was admitted to officially present his credentials to the sovereign, a ceremony he described in great detail, of course, 33 and this made him eligible to fully participate in the life of the court and to socialize with the Russian courtiers and foreign diplomats. As he reported to Madrid, on the Christmas day (Old Style) he came to congratulate Peter II who allegedly received him with great attention and even deigned to converse at some length, something that the teenage monarch was not in the habit of doing with the diplomats. 34 On the New Year Day (January 12/1) de Liria presented the emperor with a fine gun, which so much pleased the monarch that he invited the duke to dine with him, again, a favor, allegedly, granted very rarely to foreign diplomats. Drinking the health of the king of Spain and of the Russian ruler was, naturally, an important element of this interaction. 35 And wine, indeed, begins to occupy a prominent place in the duke's reports to Madrid. It is sometimes around the New Year that he stresses in a report to his government the problems he was facing in securing the adequate supply of wine, a matter evidently of great importance for him. A cargo of wine and other goods, worth 1000 doublons, perished along with the ship carrying it en route from France, while the bourgogne and champagne that he purchased in St. Petersburg in advance twice suffered from the autumnal floods and was largely ruined. So, the duke was now forced to pay as much as a doublon per bottle. 36 He also finds it proper to describe in his dispatches to his government how on the way from St. Petersburg to Moscow his wine, worth over 2000 pesos, froze in bottles and so was all ruined. 37 So, in the run-up to the Epiphany day de Liria was busy establishing himself at the Russian court and in the court society with drinking being an important element of these activities. On December 5/16, 1727, he noted in particular the sumptuous celebration of St. Andrew's day. The Order of St. Andrew, of course, was the most prestigious order of the realm established by Peter I himself, who used it as an important mechanism for building connections with foreign rulers and aristocrats and for delimiting the circle of his chosen associates. Peter II, as de Liria records, hosted a dinner for all the members of the order, and then visited each of them in his house drinking three glasses of wine on each stop. On subsequent days the monarch also visited each of them in turn do dine: it is not clear whether de Liria could attend any of these events, but this must have been a powerful reminder of the importance of belonging to a fraternity of the chosen. 38 On the Epiphany day itself, January 17/6, de Liria witnessed a large ceremony on the Neva's ice, that involved the emperor parading at the head of the Preobrzhenskii Guards and a church service performed by numerous bishops. 39 De Liria must have been present, but whether he took part in any social events on this occasion, is not clear. On January 10/21, however, Magnan, the French charge d'affairs, reports that "avant-hier" -i.e., presumably, on January 8/19 -de Liria hosted a dinner for foreign diplomats. 40 That might have well been the occasion when the project for the Ordre des Antisobres has been presented by its author(s), and when the French diplomat got the copy of it that ended up in the Paris archive. In this case, it would make sense to suppose that de Liria -rather than Marderfeld -authored the document. Indeed, setting up this order would fit well his immediate concerns at that time, those of establishing himself as the key player in the social life of the court and the diplomatic corps, something that he was also entitled to given his exceptionally high aristocratic status -in that regards he was certainly far superior to all other foreign representatives in Russia. He was also entitled to a leadership role due to the standing of the monarch he represented: the king of Spain demanded that his ambassador in matters of ceremonial maintained himself on equal footing with the representatives of the Holy Roman Emperor and the king of France; notably, at that moment the new Habsburg envoy hasn't arrived in Russia yet, and France was represented by a mere charge d'affaires. And indeed, de Liria's managed to secure for himself quite an exceptional status, as the only diplomat to be granted a stool at the coronation ceremony. 41 Finally, composing this charter would also fi very well with de Liria's subsequent cautions. While it is not clear whether the idea has actually caught on and whether any meetings of the order ever took place, de Liria did very actively practice the "drinking diplomacy" during his stay in Russia. On March 1/11, according to his report, he hosted a dinner for Peter II and his companions: the duke received him "with all the magnificence he could." Three tables were set up for twenty persons each, and a concert followed. The monarch stayed for as an hour and a half, an exceptionally long visit (or so de Liria wanted his superiors to believe), and 500 bottles of wine were emptied. 42 A week later, on March 6/17, this fraternizing was followed up with the duke's elevation to the Order of St. Andrew. 43 De Liria now did not need to make up fictional orders -he became officially a member of Russia's most select fraternity of the chosen. Appropriately, on April 1 (New Style), Peter II again came to de Liria's to dine, accompanied this time by all the cavaliers of St. Andrew and the members of Supreme Privy Council. 600 bottles of wine were consumed, and the monarch was "very content and very joyful." 44 On July 27, 1728, de Liria threw a grandest party of them all -again meticulously listing 310 bottles of Tokay, 250 bottles of Champaign, 170 bottles of Bourgogne, 220 bottles of Rheine wine, 160 bottles of Mosel, and 12 barrels of French wines consumed by his guest. 45 Obviously, the importance of "drinking diplomacy" was widely recognized, and de Liria was not the only diplomate to engage in them. On March 16 Magnan reported with a great relief that Peter II came to his house to dine with a company of his followers -and this visit alleviated the "mortification" the Frenchmen felt few days earlier when the "old Russian" courtiers ignored the very first ceremonial banquet he gave in his official capacity (out of 29 guests invited, only 3 attended). 46 And years later, in May 1733, the Saxon envoy reported that "not a week passes without Mardefeld treating a couple of times." 47 Still, de Liria might have been especially prone to practicing this approach. Claudius Rondeau, the British representative, who due to his lower social standing and diplomatic status appears to have been somewhat removed from from the life of the court, was actually puzzled by the duke excessive, in his view, socializing: as he observed in August 1728, "The Duke of Liria is entirely given up to his pleasures, so that I cannot apprehend there is any great affair carrying on by him, unless he has some man of business who does not appear." 48 Half a year later, in February 1729, he again reported that "The Duke of Liria continues making a very great figure and spends prodigious sums"; this time he recognizes, though, that this "has gained him great credit with the Czar and the affections of the common people." 49 In fact, Rondeau also reported that when de Liria was leaving St. Petersburg (without having achieved much diplomatically) in November 1730, Empress Anna granted him a large sum of money to cover the huge expenses he made while in Russia. 50 Thus setting up the mock order certainly fit very well with de Liria's overall style of diplomacy in general and with his efforts early in 1728 to position himself as an important player in the life of the Russian court. It might have, however, reflected also some of the more specific diplomatic concerns he had at this time. One of them has to do with his choice of Mardefeld as his co-equal partner in setting up the order, its "Protector." In a sense, the Prussian was certainly a natural choice -a senior diplomat who has been in Russia for a decade by that time and who probably outranked all other representatives of the major European powers at that point. Importantly, however, upon his arrival de Liria was still trying to prevent a rapprochement between Russia and England (a mission made untimely irrelevant by Spain's own reconciliation with England next year). 51 Being in touch with Mardefeld was crucially important here, as it is to the Dutch and Prussian envoys that the task of patching things up between St. Petersburg and London was given, and in early January 1728, according to Magnan, Mardefeld in particular "continue [d] working towards reconciliation between England and Russia." 52 Furthermore, the Prussian was crucially important for another project de Liria had at this moment. As it turns out, while the Prussian-Saxon society of the antisobres was a vehicle for promoting the succession of the Saxon prince to the Polish throne, de Liria was setting up his order exactly as he was intriguing in favor of an alternative claimant for the crown of the Commonwealth. Apparently, on his way to Russia Liria attempted to get his master James III included in the will of his father-in-law, Jakub Ludwik Henryk Sobieski (King Jan Sobieski's son). 53 And Rondeau reported in August 1729 that "When the duke of Liria first came here, he
Rondeau, "That proposal was communicated to the king of Prussia, who, I suppose, acquainted His Polish Majesty of it, for some time after count Manteuffel wrote to the duke of Liria from Dresden a letter in which he found fault that his grace should make any such proposals. The duke answered the count's letter, and told him, it was true he had no orders from the king, his master, for so doing, but that it was very natural for him, who had the honour to be of the family, to do all he could for their interest. This put an end to that affair, and no more has been said of it." 54 .
Additionally, some of provisions in the charter as well as initiative to create the order might be also read in the context of another political intrigue. As de Liria arrived in Russia, he perceived Ostermann as the staunchest supporter of Russia's adherence to the Vienna allianceand thus his most likely supporter at the court. However, Ostermann's standing, as de Liria himself emphasized, was complicated by the struggle to control the rapidly growing up Peter IIthe struggle that pitted Ostermann, his tutor, who supposedly tried to steer the teenage monarch away from dissolute life and towards the affairs of state, on the one hand, and Peter II's young favorite, Prince Ivan Dolgorukov, and the aristocratic clique that stood behind him, on the other. This rivalry was also conceptualized by de Liria as a struggle between the forces that promoted the Petrine course of European engagement (wich de Liria also supported) and those who advocated disengagement and retreat to Moscow. 55 Subsequently, de Liria would seek to triangulate between Dolgorukov and Ostermann and, as mentioned earlier, very much promote drinking-based socializing. In the early 1728, however, the charter's provisions focused on moderation in drinking (at the very least, calling for not forcing anyone to drink more than he desired) could, perhaps, be viewed as an attempt to provide a relatively more "polite" and controlled setting for the young monarch to socialize with his retinue? Note, by the way, that Gustav Mardefeld in particular appears to have been previously complaining about "the many festivities and drinking" in Peter I's time, that not only were extremely taxing for the foreign diplomates health-wise, but were also used by the Russians as as a way of temporizing during negotiations: During his binges the Tsar "should not be harassed by affairs," and the day after "all had to keep the bed, and no one was able to read or write." Under Peter II, however, mandatory drinking from the great tankard was abolished in favor of small jars, while the guests were left to drink at will. 56 Finally, besides drinking, de Liria early in 1728 describes Peter II as prone, despite his early age, to womanizing: the august teenager's many affairs with ladies are presented as another important dimension of the struggle to control the tsar by his courtiers and by Ostermann in particular. Peter II's alleged infatuation (and possible liaison) with his step-aunt, Tsesarevna Elizabeth (the future empress) is depicted in the duke's dispatches as especially scandalous and disruptive of Ostermann's attempts to make the monarch more concerned with his studies and with statesmanship. And indeed, around this time there was allegedly a plan to marry Peter to a 54 SIRIO, vol. 66, 69. Later on, de Liria tried to promote one of Philip V's sons as candidate to the Polish throne. Rondeau on
